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Abstract
The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes.
Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for
the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects
is 12 on M and 6 on S. 
Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics
at Bonn University using RatImage. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel
time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. Money payoffs increase with decreasing
time. The main results are as follows. 
1. Mean numbers on M and S are very near to the equilibrium. 
2. Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments. 
3. Fluctuations are smaller under treatment II .The effect is small but significant. 
4. The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. 
5. Subjects’ road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated in all sessions. 
6. A direct response mode reacts with more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary
response mode shows opposite reactions. Both response modes can be observed. 
7. The simulation of an extended payoff sum learning model closely fits the main results of
the statistical evaluation of the data. 
JEL Code: C91, C92, C15, L91, R4.
Keywords: travel behaviour research, information in intelligent transportation systems, day-
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Reinhard Selten











T. Pitz – T. Chmura – S. Kube




We are grateful to the BMBF for financial support.1 Introduction 
 
Understanding individual travel behaviour is essential for the design of Advanced Traveller 
Information Systems (ATIS), which provide real-time travel information, like link travel times 
(ADLER AND BLUE 1998, BARFIELD AND DINGUS 1998). However, the response of road users to 
information is still an open question (E.G., BEN-AKIVA 1991, BONSALL 1992, MAHMASSANI AND 
LIU 1999). It is not clear whether more information is beneficial (BEN-AKIVA ET AL. 1991). 
Drivers confronted with too much information may become oversaturated in the sense that 
information processing becomes to difficult and users develop simple heuristics to solve the 
problem (GIGERENZER ET AL. 1999).  
 
Drivers may also overreact to information and thereby cause additional fluctuations. Thus, the 
behaviour of the drivers has to be incorporated in the forecast (e.g. WAHLE ET AL. 2000, BEN-
AKIVA ET AL. 1991, BONSALL 1992). ATIS can reduce fluctuations only if behavioural effects are 
correctly taken into account.  
 
The Literature reports a number of experiments on route choice behaviour (e.g. BONSALL 1992, 
MAHMASSANI AND LIU 1999). Here we focus on the route choice in a generic two route scenario, 
which already has been investigated in the literature (e.g. IIDA ET AL. 1992). However our aim is 
to present experiments with a large number of periods and with sufficiently many independent 
observations for meaningful applications of non-parametric significance tests. 
 2 
If one wants to investigate results of day to day route choice which can be transferred to more 
realistic environments, it is necessary to explore individual behaviour in an interactive 
experimental set-up. Does behaviour converge to equilibrium? Does more feedback reduce 
fluctuations? What is the structure of individual responses to recent experiences? Our 
experimental study tries to throw light on these questions. 
 
2  Experimental Set-Up 
 
Subjects are told that in each of 200 periods they have to make a choice between a main road M 
and a side road S for travelling from A to B.  
 
               main road       
 
    A                                                B    
 
             side  road 
Figure 1: Participants had to choose between a side road [S] and a main road [M] 
They were told that M is faster if M and S are chosen by the same number of people. The number 
of subjects in each session was 18, mostly law and economic students from the University of 
 3Bonn. The time t  and   depends on the numbers   and n  of participants choosing M and S, 
respectively: 
M S t M n S
M M n t 2 6   
S S n t 3 12  . 
The period payoff was 40 – t with t =   if M was chosen and t = t  if S was chosen.   M t S
 
The total payoff of a subject was the sum of all 200 period payoffs converted to money payoffs in 
DM with a fixed exchange rate of .015 DM for each experimental money unit (Taler). 
Additionally, every participant received a lump sum payment of 200 Taler and a show- up fee of 
10 DM. One session took roughly one and a half hours.  
 
All pure equilibria of the game are characterized by  
M n=   12 and n=   6,  S
resulting in a period payoff of 10 Taler per player. This sums up to 180 Taler per period, differing 
from the pareto-optimum with 181 Taler. The pareto-optimum can be reached by 
M n=   11 and n=  7 .   S
Two treatments have been investigated. In treatment I the subjects received: 
 
-  travel time of the last chosen route 
-  last chosen route 
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-  payoff of the last period in Taler -  cumulated payoff in Taler 
-  number of the actual period 
 
In treatment II additional feedback was provided about the travel time on the non-chosen-route in 
the last period. Six sessions were run with treatment I and six with treatment II. No further 
information was given to the subjects. 
 
 
3  Equilibrium Predictions and Observed Behaviour 
 
3.1.  Number of players on the side road S 
 
Figure 2 shows the number of participants on the side road S as a function of time for a typical 
session of treatment I. 
It can be seen that there is no convergence to the theoretical equilibrium. There are substantial 
fluctuations until the end of the session. The same is true for all sessions of both treatments. The 
overall average of numbers of participants on S is very near to the equilibrium prediction. In each 
session the median number of players on the side road S is 6. The mean number of players on the 
side road S is 5.98 in treatment I and 6.06 in treatment II. The standard deviation of the session 
average from 6 is never greater than .17 and it is only .07 on the average. The fluctuations can be 
measured by the standard deviation of the number of participants choosing S per period. This 
 5standard deviation is between 1.53 and 1.94. In view of these numbers one can speak of 
substantial fluctuations in each of the 12 sessions.  
 
The fluctuations are a little larger under treatment I than under treatment II. The effect is 
significant. The null-hypothesis is rejected by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on the 





































Figure 2: Number of participants on S [a typical session of treatment I]. 
 
The game underlying the experiment has many pure strategy equilibrium points. In all of them 
the number of participants on the side road is 6, but the set of players who choose S can be any 
set of 6 players. The multiplicity of pure strategy equilibria poses a coordination problem which 
may be one of the reasons for non-convergence and the persistence of fluctuations. Feedback on 
 6both travel times vs. feedback on only own travel time has a beneficial effect by the reduction of 
fluctuations, but this effect is relatively small. 
 
3.2. Road  changes 
Figure 3 shows an example of the number of road changes as a function of time for a typical 




















































number of players on S
mean std. dev.
 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the number of players on S. 
 
 
There was a negative trend in each session of treatment II. By comparison in treatment I there 
were two sessions with a positive, two with a negative and two with an indifferent trend. 
 
The fluctuations are connected to the total number of road changes within one session.  
 
 7The Spearman-rank-correlation between the total number of road changes and the standard 
deviation of the number of participants per period on S is .795. This is significant on the level of 
1 % (one sided). The median number of road changes is significantly higher in treatment I. The 
null-hypothesis is rejected by the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on a level of 5 % (one sided). 
The mean number of road changes under treatment I is also higher than under treatment II. A 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis only on a very weak significance level 










































Figure 3: Number of road changes [a typical session of treatment I]. 
 
Under treatment I subjects who mainly choose only one of the roads feel the need to travel on the 
other road from time to time in order to get information on both roads. Under treatment II there is 
 8no necessity for such information gathering. This seems to be the reason for the greater number 




session I 01 5,08 2,298
session I 02 3,87 1,865
session I 03 5,16 1,934
session I 04 5,19 1,931
session I 05 5,28 2,391
session I 06 4,35 2,083
treatment I 4,82 2,084
session II 01 3,99 2,001
session II 02 3,68 2,039
session II 03 3,67 2,091
session II 04 5,19 2,32
session II 05 4,67 2,48
session II 06 4,44 2,044
treatment II 4,27 2,163

























Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of the number of road changes 
 
 
3.3. Payoffs   
 
The mean payoffs per period in treatment I were significantly lower than in treatment II.  The 
standard deviation of this random variable was higher in treatment I than in treatment II. In both 
cases a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis on a significance level of 5 % 
 9(one sided). Nevertheless the efficiency with regard to the pareto optimum was in treatment I .91 
and in treatment II .92. The payoffs are shown in Table 3 and 4.  
Payoff 200 Periods [Treatment I]
I 01  I 02 I 03 I 04 I 05 I 06 I 
mean 9,10 9,18 9,06 9,10 9,13 9,12 9,11
std. dev. 4,26 3,94 4,34 4,08 4,27 4,26 4,19
median 10 10 10 10 10 10
mode 10 10 10 10 10 10
min -5 -2 -8 -8 -8 -11
max 25 22 22 22 22 25  
Table 3: Mean payoffs in Treatment I. 
Payoff 200 Periods [Treatment II]
II 01 II 02  II 03 II 04 II 05 II 06 II 
mean 9,25 9,32 9,35 8,99 9,28 9,26 9,24
std. dev. 3,80 3,77 3,60 4,58 3,85 4,03 3,94
median 10 10 10 10 10 10
mode 10 10 10 10 10 10
min -2 -5 -2 -17 -2 -5
max 22 22 22 28 22 25  
Table 4: Mean payoffs in Treatment II. 
 
One might see that the information about the travel time on both routes effects only a small 
difference concerning the payoffs.  
 
3.4.  Payoffs and road changes 
 
In all sessions the number of road changes of a subject is negatively correlated with the subject’s 
payoff. Figure 4 shows that the negative correlation between the payoff in treatment II is stronger 
than in treatment I.  
 10 
Treatment I  Treatment II











I 02 I 03 I 04 I 05 I 06 II 01 II 02  II 03 II 04 II 05 II 06
 
Figure 5: Spearmen rank correlation between cumulative payoffs and the number of road 
changes for each session of treatment I and II. 
 
In both treatments the Spearman rank correlations between cumulative payoffs and the number of 
road changes are strictly negative. The Spearman-correlation-coefficients in treatment II are 
 11lower than in treatment I. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis on a 
significance level of 5 % (one sided). It is observed that some players in treatment I get an above 
average payoff even though they have a high change rate. The reason why this effect is not so 
often observed in treatment II might be, that the additional information about the travel time of 
the non chosen route was given. So it is not necessary for players to change in order to collect 
information. This might explain, that 3 players always stayed on the main road in treatment II, 
nevertheless it is surprising that one player did the same in treatment I. 
 
Even if subjects change roads in order to get higher payoffs, they do not succeed in doing this on 
the average. This suggests that it is difficult to use the information provided by the feedback to 
one’s advantage.  
 
 
4 Response  mode 
 
A participant who had a bad payoff on the road chosen may change his road in order to travel 
where it is less crowded. We call this the direct response mode. A road change is the more 
probable the worse the payoff was. 
 
The direct response mode is the prevailing one but there is also a contrarian response mode. 
Under the contrarian response mode a road change is more likely the better the payoff was. The 
 12contrarian participant expects that a high payoff will attract many others and that therefore the 
road chosen will be crowded in the next period.  
 
The equilibrium payoff is 10. Payoffs perceived as bad tend to be below 10 and payoffs perceived 
as good  tend to be above 10. Accordingly we classified the response of a subject as direct if the 
road is changed after a payoff smaller than 10 or not changed after a payoff greater than 10. An 
opposite response is classified as contrarian. Table 2 shows the numbers of times in which a 
subject changes roads (c- for a payoff below 10 and c+ for a payoff above 10), or stays at the same 
road (s- for a payoff below 10 and s+ for a payoff above 10).  
 
  change stay 
payoff < 10 
 c    s  
payoff > 10 
 c    s  
 
Table 5: 2x2 table for the computation of Yule coefficients. 
 
For each subject such a 2x2 table has been determined and a Yule coefficient Q has been 
computed as follows. 
 
   




s c s c
s c s c
Q  
 
The Yule coefficient has a range from –1 to +1. In our case a high Yule coefficient reflects a 
tendency towards direct responses and a low one a tendency towards contrarian responses.  
 
 13In each of four sessions, one of them in Treatment I and three in treatment II, there was one 
player for whom no Yule coefficient could be determined since these four subjects never change 
roads. These subjects are not considered in the evaluation of Yule coefficients. 
The mean and the standard deviation of the Yule coefficients are shown in Table 6. 
 
mean std. dev.
session I 01 0,214 0,654
session I 02 0,373 0,592
session I 03 0,277 0,525
session I 04 0,191 0,603
session I 05 0,313 0,584
session I 06 0,332 0,542
treatment I 0,283 0,585
session II 01 0,365 0,591
session II 02 0,374 0,536
session II 03 0,308 0,552
session II 04 0,271 0,584
session II 05 0,246 0,738
session II 06 0,122 0,557




























Table 6: Mean and standard deviation of the Yule coefficients in both treatments. 
 
Evidence for the importance of both response modes can be found in the distributions of Yule 
coefficients within a session. If the two response modes were not present in behaviour one would 
expect distributions of Yule coefficients concentrated around 0. However the number of subjects 
with extreme Yule coefficients below –.5 or above +.5 tends to be greater than the number of 
subjects with Yule coefficients in the middle range between –.5 and +.5. A Wilcoxon one sample 
 14test supports this alternative hypothesis by rejecting the null-hypothesis that none of both 
numbers tends to be greater than the other, on the significance level of 1 % (two sided). 
 
If one classifies subjects with Yule coefficients above +.5 as direct responders and subjects with 
Yule coefficients below -.5 as contrarian responders, then one receives 44 % direct responders, 
14% contrarian responders and 42% unclassified subjects. The distribution of the Yule 
coefficients is shown in figure 6. 
 





In order to get more insight into this theoretical significance of our result, we have run 
simulations based on a version of a well known reinforcement learning model, the payoff-sum 
 15model. This model already described by Harley (1981) and later by Arthur (1991) has been used 
extensively by Ereth and Roth (1995) in the experimental economics literature. 
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Table 7: The Payoff-Sum Model 
 
Table 7 explains the version underlying our simulations. (kasten) We are looking at player i who has to 
choose among n strategies 1,…,n over a number of periods t, t=1..T. The probabilities with which 
each strategy i is chosen is proportional to its “propensity”  . In period 1 these propensities are 
t
j i x ,
 16exogenously determined parameters. Whenever the strategy j is used in period t, the resulting 
payoff   is added to the propensity if this payoff is positive. If all payoffs are positive, then the 
propensity is the sum of all previous payoffs for this strategy plus its initial propensity. Therefore 
one can think of a propensity as a payoff sum.  
t
i a
In our experiments negative payoffs are not impossible. This creates a difficulty for the model, 
since one has to exclude the case that a propensity becomes negative. In the literature this is 
sometime solved by adding up the exponential of the payoffs instead of the payoffs themselves. 
Here we take another approach to this problem. If a negative payoff is obtained for the use of the 
strategy xi, the absolute value of this payoff is added to all other propensities and the propensity 
of the strategy i remains unchanged. We think that this is the simplest generalisation of the 
original payoff sum model which was conceived for positive payoffs only. 
 
In our simulations 18 players interact for 200 periods just like in our experiments. Each player 
has four strategies: 
  1. main road: 
  This strategy simply consists in taking the decision for the main road. 
  2. side road: 
  This strategy consists in taking the side road. 
  3. direct: 
This strategy corresponds to the direct response mode. The payoff of a player is compared 
to his median payoff among his payoffs for all periods up to now. If the present payoff is 
 17lower then this median payoff, then the road is changed. If the payoff is greater than this 
median payoff, the player stays on the same road as before. It may also happen that the 
current payoff is equal to the median payoff. In this case, the road is changed if the 
number of previous payoffs above the median is greater than the number of previous 
payoffs below the median. In the opposite case, the road is not changed. In the rare cases 
where both numbers are equal, the road is changed with probability ½. 
  4. contrarian: 
A player who takes this strategy stays on the last chosen road if his current payoff is 
smaller then the median payoff among the payoffs for all previous periods and he changes 
the road in the opposite case. If the current payoff is equal to this median payoff, then he 
changes the road if the number of previous payoff below the median payoff is greater then 
the number above the median payoff. If the numbers of previous payoff below and above 
the median payoff are equal, the road is changed with probability ½. 
 
In the first period only strategy one and two were available to the simulated subjects since 
strategy three and four cannot be applied because there is not yet a median of previous payoffs. 
 
The strategies direct and contrarian describe the response modes discussed in section 4, but with 
a small difference. There changing and staying was conditioned on how the last payoff differed 
from the equilibrium payoff 10. In the experiments the median payoff is very often at 10. 
However, in the simulations we did not want to build in prejudices based on theoretical values. 
 18Our simulated players base their behaviour on initial propensities and observations only. Of 
course, it is assumed that as in the experiments the players get feedback about their own payoffs 
immediately after their choices. In the experimental treatment II additional feedback about the 
payoff on the route not chosen was given. The payoff sum model makes use of a player’s own 
payoff only and therefore ignores the additional feedback of treatment II. 
 
The differences between treatment I and treatment II cannot be explained by the payoff sum 
model since it does not process the additional feedback information given in treatment II. For the 
purposes of comparing our simulation data with the experimental data we ignore the differences 
between treatment I and II which are not big anyhow. 
 
The difficulty arises that the initial propensities must be estimated from the data. We did this by 
varying the initial propensities for the strategies main road and side road over all integer values 
from 1 to 10 and the initial propensities for the strategies direct and contrarian over all integer 
values from 0 to 10. We compared the simulation results with the six variables listed in table 8. 
We aimed at simulation results which were between the minimum and maximum experimental 
results over all twelve sessions of treatment I and II. For each of the 12100 parameter 
combinations we have run 1000 simulations. There was only one parameter combination which 
satisfied the requirement of yielding means for the six variables between the minimal and 
maximal experimentally observed values. This was the parameter combination (4,3,3,2). The 
numbers refer to main road,  side road,  direct and contrarian in this order. The parameter 
 19combination is a reasonable vector of initial propensities. The players know that the capacity of 
the main road is greater than that of the side road and the first two parameters reflect this 
knowledge. It is reasonable to suppose that at least in the beginning the simple strategies main 
road and side road have a greater propensity sum than direct and contrarian. 
 
min Ex I & II  Simulations max Ex I & II
mean(#(players[S])) 5,85 5,88 6,17
std_dev(#(players[S])) 1,53 1,65 1,94
mean(#(road_ch)) 3,67 5,17 5,28
mean(#(last_road_ch)) 154,78 183,73 190,39
mean(yule) 0,12 0,14 0,37
std_dev(yule) 0,52 0,60 0,74  
Table 8: Experiments and simulations with 18 players. 
 
It is surprising that a very simple reinforcement model reproduces the experimental data as well 
as shown by table 8. Even the mean Yule coefficient is in the experimentally observed range. In 
spite of the fact that at the beginning of the simulation the behaviour of all simulated players is 
exactly the same. It is not assumed that there are different types of players. The distribution of the 
Yule coefficients of the simulated subjects is shown in figure 8. This distribution does not look 
exactly like the one of the experimentally observed Yule coefficient shown by figure 6. There are 
more values in the central range between -.5 and +.5. However, like in figure 6, many more 
observations are in the upper quartile than in the lowest one. This indicates that the direct 





Figure 7: Distribution of the simulated Yule coefficients. 
 
The distribution of the Yule coefficients shown by figure 7 suggests that during the play the 
behaviour of many simulated players more and more concentrates on one strategy. This is the 
result of different learning histories. 
 
It is not clear that in the actual experiments tendencies toward direct and contrarian behaviour are 
mere results of the learning history during the play of the game. Probably some of the 
experimental subjects bring such tendencies already to the laboratory. This may be due to prior 
learning outside the laboratory or to inherited behavioural inclinations. We do not want to pass 
judgement on this but an initial heterogeneity might explain the somewhat smaller concentration 
 21of the experimental data in the middle range. One could of course try to get an even closer 
agreement with the experimental data by using a simulation model with subject heterogeneity. 





The study has shown that the mean numbers on both roads tend to be very near to the 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments. 
This is of particular interest in view of the fact that the experiments run over 200 periods which is 
unusually long and should be enough to show a tendency of convergence to equilibrium, if there 
is one. 
 
Feedback on both road times significantly reduces fluctuations in treatment II compared to 
treatment I. However the effect is small. There is a significant rank correlation between the total 
number of road changes and the size of fluctuations. In treatment I road changes may serve the 
purpose of information gathering. This motivation has no basis in treatment II. However road 
changes may also be attempts to improve payoffs. The finding of a negative correlation between 
a subject’s payoff and number of road changes suggests that on the average such attempts are not 
successful. 
 
 22Two response modes can be found in the data, a direct one in which road changes follow bad 
payoffs and a contrarian one in which road changes follow good payoffs. One can understand 
these response modes as due to different views of the causal structure of the situation. If one 
expects that the road which is crowded today is likely to be crowded tomorrow one will be in the 
direct response mode but if one thinks that many people will change to the other road because it 
was crowded today one has reason to be in the contrarian response mode. We have presented 
statistical evidence for the importance of the two response modes. 
 
We have also run simulations based on a simple payoff sum reinforcement model. Simulated 
mean values of six variables have been compared with the experimentally observed minimal and 
maximal of these variables. The simulated means were always in this range. Only four 
parameters of the simulation model, the initial propensities, were estimated from the data. In view 
of the simplicity of the model it is surprising that one obtains a quite close fit to the experimental 
data. The response modes direct and contrarian also appear in the simulations as the result of an 
endogenous learning behaviour by which initially homogeneous subjects become differentiated 
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-  Altogether 18 persons are participating in this experiment. The game situation is the same for every 
participant. 
 
-  The experiment consists of 200 periods. 
 
-  In each period you are travelling from a starting point A to an arrival point B. You can either choose 
a main road or a side road to get from A to B (see drawing). 
 
                                         Main road 
 
 
                                             A  B 
 
 
                 Side road 
 
-  For the travel time from A to B the following holds: On both routes the travel time increases with 
increasing traffic and decreases with decreasing traffic. If traffic is the same on the main and on the side 
road, the travel time is shorter on the main road than on the side road. 
 
-  You can make a new route choice in every period. 
 
-  Your payoffs per period: 
After each period you will receive a period payoff P which depends on the travel time T. Hereby holds: 
P = 40-T.E.g. the shorter the travel time needed, the higher the payoff. 
 
-  Your information per period:  
The travel time on the route that you chose in the preceding period 
The travel time on the route that you did not choose in the preceding period (only in Experiment II) 
Your route chosen in the preceding period. 
Your period payoffs in the preceding period in Talers. 
Your cumulated payoffs before the route choice in Talers. 
Number of the current period. 
 
-  Each participant receives a seed capital of 200 Talers. The exchange rate is 1,5 Pf per Taler. 
 















Ihre Streckenwahl?  Your route choice? 
Hauptstrecke main  road 
Nebenstrecke   side road 
Bitte wählen Sie...  Please choose... 
Fahrtzeit letzte Runde auf   travel time in the preceding period on 
der Hauptstrecke   the main road 
der Nebenstrecke   the side road 
zuletzt gewählte Strecke   route chosen in the preceding period 
Ihre Periodenauszahlung letzte Runde   Your period payoffs in the preceding period 
Ihre kumulierte Auszahlung vor der Wahl   Your accumulated payoffs before the route 
choice 
Es läuft Runde   This is period  
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